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Shades and concepts
Jérôme Dokic & Élisabeth Pacherie
1. Introduction
According to the conceptualist approach in the philosophy of percep-
tion, perceptual content is fully conceptual. Against this view non-
conceptualists argue that perceptual experiences have a fineness of grain
that far outstrips what can be captured in terms of concepts possessed by
the perceiver. They claim, for instance, that the number of colour shades
we perceptually discriminate far exceeds the number of colour concepts we
have or could have. Both McDowell (1994) and Brewer (1999) acknowl-
edge the fine-grainedness of perceptual experience and yet contend that it
can perfectly be captured by concepts. According to them, the non-
conceptualists’ argument rests on an unduly restrictive view of concepts as
necessarily corresponding with entirely context-independent classifications
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of things. This amounts to restricting the concepts available to capture per-
ceptual discriminations to those associated with verbal expression, which
have context-independent norms of application. Once this restriction is
lifted, it becomes possible for the conceptualist to argue that perceptual
experience with all its fineness of grain can be fully captured by appropri-
ate demonstrative concepts. Thus, the fact that a perceiver is capable of a
perceptual discrimination between, say, two shades of red for which she
lacks correspondingly different context-independent colour concepts does
not make the content of her experience non-conceptual. It is perfectly pos-
sible for her to capture this difference in her perceptual experience of the
two shades in terms of demonstrative concepts like coloured thus or this
shade, that exploit the presence of samples of the shades in question.
For the conceptualist strategy to be successful it must meet two condi-
tions of adequacy. First, it should be phenomenologically adequate, that is,
provide a satisfactory account of all aspects of the phenomenology of
colour perception. Second, the strategy should also be conceptually ade-
quate. In other words, the conceptualists should demonstrate that the 
purported demonstrative colour concepts (DCCs for short) they claim can
capture the fine-grained content of colour experience satisfy central crite-
ria of concepthood and hence really qualify as concepts. We will start with
some preliminary remarks regarding phenomenology (§2) but our main
concern will be with the second condition of adequacy (§3 to §5). We will
argue that DCCs fail to meet three related criteria for concepthood that
form part of the conceptualist’s own conception of concepts. First, these
purported concepts have implausible conditions of individuation and
violate an intuitive Criterion of Difference for concepts. Second, there are
no recognitional capacities associated with DCCs and as a consequence
their inferential potential is severely restricted. Third, DCCs cannot play
the role the conceptualists want them to play in the justification of judge-
ments by perception. Our conclusion will be that, as a consequence, we are
left with no reason to admit that a judgement involving a DCC is really an
exercise of a colour concept.
2. Colour shades and demonstrative colour concepts
One problem that confronts a conceptualist account of colour perception
is that colour indiscriminability is non-transitive. Colour samples a, b and
c can be found such that, for a normal observer, b is indiscriminable from
a and c is indiscriminable from b and yet c is discriminable from a. As a
result and as the conceptualists admit, the rule according to which two
things fall under the same DCC if and only if they are indiscriminable in
colour is incoherent. According to this rule, any coloured thing would fall
under the DCC, for it is always possible to link the colour of that thing with
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that of the perceived sample through a chain of things each of which is
indiscriminable in colour from its neighbours. This would entail that 
everything has the same colour! What the conceptualists claim, though, is
that a different rule underlies the application of a DCC. Grasp of a DCC
is provided by the perception of a coloured sample, and its extension com-
prises anything that is indiscriminable in colour from that sample (at 
the time of its perception) (McDowell 1994: 170ff.; Brewer 1999: 174–75).
Arguably, the latter rule, unlike the former one, does not suffer from 
incoherence.
It is worth considering two immediate implications of the new rule. First,
as Brewer himself notes, any given thing is apt to fall under more than one
DCC. Second, and conversely, a given DCC comprises in its extension
things that are discriminable in colour. In the following table, Cx is the
DCC which is grasped in perceiving a coloured thing x, and whose exten-
sion is described on the same line:
Suppose for instance that b is some red thing perceived through a demon-
strative concept Cb. With regard to the first implication, b falls under the
concept Cb, since, trivially, it is indiscriminable from itself. But b is also
indiscriminable from two other red things, namely a and c, hence also falls
under both Ca and Cc. Conversely, with respect to the second implication,
the concept Cb equally characterizes a and c, which are indiscriminable 
in colour from b, although they are discriminable from each other (they
appear to have two different shades of red).
This raises a difficulty, for isn’t it incoherent to suppose that a given
thing, although uniformly coloured, presents more than one shade at a
given time to a given observer? As McDowell (1994: 56) puts it, a shade is
less a band than a line on the spectrum. The relevant conception of a shade
is roughly the one used by Russell (1921) and Goodman (1951), according
to which two things x and y have the same shade (in given conditions) if
and only if all things indiscriminable in colour from x are also indiscrimi-
a b c
b
b
Ca
Cb
Cc
Cd
a
c d
c d
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nable in colour from y. Now colour shades, just as colours tout court, are
mutually exclusive. As a uniformly coloured thing cannot be both red and
green at the same time (in fixed conditions of observation), a given sample,
say b, cannot have more than one shade at a given time (in fixed conditions
of observation).
From the conceptualists’ point of view the proper response to this diffi-
culty should be to concede that a DCC itself is not a concept of a colour
shade, precisely because its extension is composed of things that have dif-
ferent shades. Moreover, the conceptualists can claim that there are 
circumstances in which Russell-Goodman shades are perceived as such.
Suppose that the subject perceives three red things, say a, b and c, 
close together. The concept of the shade of b can be defined as the logical
product of concepts Ca, Cb and Cc which, by hypothesis, are grasped by
the subject. Under this compound concept neither a nor c but only b falls.
The conceptualist can argue that the conceptual content of such an ex-
perience is sophisticated enough to allow the subject to perceive the exclu-
sive shade of b. DCCs themselves do not slice the phenomenal world as
finely as they should (they correspond to bands on the spectrum), but their
logical products do.
Of course, if there is only one sample around in the visual field, say b, its
shade will necessarily be perceived in a somewhat indeterminate way. In
such a situation, (by hypothesis) the concept Cb is grasped, but the con-
cepts Ca and Cc themselves (and thus the relevant logical product) cannot
be grasped, since this would require the perceptual presence of samples a
and c. (More on this later.) This seems to imply that the introduction of a
second sample, say a or c, in the visual field, changes the perceptual appear-
ance of b, but this may be a conclusion that conceptualists can live with.
So let us suppose – perhaps generously – that the conceptualists’ story
about perception having a fully conceptual content is phenomenologically
adequate, at least in the sense that it slices the phenomenal world finely
enough. Moreover, we will continue to write, as the conceptualists do, as
if a DCC is a concept of a colour shade, although we have just seen that
this is not obvious. We now turn to our main concern, which is the con-
ceptual adequacy of the conceptualists’ account.
3. The individuation of demonstrative colour concepts
According to a plausible Criterion of Difference, two concepts (considered
as the senses of predicates) are different if the subject who grasps them at
the same time can rationally adopt different epistemic attitudes towards
thoughts containing them (which are otherwise identical). For instance, if
it is possible for a rational subject to believe (in a particular context) that
everything which is thusa is thusa, where both tokens of ‘thusa’ express the
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same DCC grounded on the perception of a, while not believing that every-
thing which is thusa is thusb, where the token ‘thusb’ expresses a DCC
grounded on the perception of b, then the concept expressed by ‘thusa’ is
not the same as the concept expressed as ‘thusb’.
The Criterion of Difference for concepts implies that, if a subject grasps
two concepts at the same time, she is at least sometimes in a position to
know that the concepts are different. That is, if she can rationally adopt
different epistemic attitudes towards certain thoughts containing them, she
knows that they are different. Note that this implication is compatible with
the externalist view (accepted by McDowell) that we do not always know
infallibly that we have really grasped a given concept, for here it is pre-
supposed that the relevant DCCs are indeed grasped by the subject.
Now suppose that the subject perceives two samples of the same colour
shade – say, a1 and a2. It is natural to suppose that the DCCs grounded on
the perception of these samples are the same. After all, not only do they
seem to be coloured exactly alike, but they really do have the same colour
shade. However, it seems always possible for a rational subject to believe
that everything which is thusa1 is thusa1, while doubting whether everything
which is thusa1 is thusa2. For all she knows on the basis of perceptual
appearance, there might be a sample that is indiscriminable from a2 but dis-
criminable from a1. Such a sample would fall under thusa2 but not under
thusa1. This is a coherent epistemic possibility, which implies, according to
the Criterion, that ‘thusa1’ and ‘thusa2’ express different concepts (in this
context).
If we accept the Criterion of Difference for concepts, then, it seems
impossible to grasp the same DCC through the perception of numerically
distinct objects that look exactly the same as far as their most specific
colour is concerned. In fact, there is an infinite number of DCCs for a given
shade, since they are necessarily tied to particular samples. So either con-
ceptualists admit that there are conceptual differences in the contents of
perception which do not correspond to any phenomenological differences,
or they slice the phenomenal world too finely. Beside the fact that neither
option is intrinsically plausible, the common experience of perceiving 
internal relations between different shades presented at a given time (for
instance, perceiving that two samples have exactly the same shade) has not
been provided for.
4. Concepts, recognition and inference
Another objection to the conceptualist strategy is that DCCs are not asso-
ciated with any recognitional capacity. It seems plausible to suppose that
mastery of an observational concept implies a capacity to identify and 
reidentify perceptual instances of the concept. This means that, to have a
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concept of a given colour shade, one must be able to recognize coloured
objects over time, not just to discriminate two simultaneously presented
ones. McDowell acknowledges that possession of an observational concept
presupposes a certain recognitional capacity. Indeed, he maintains that
what ensures that ‘that shade’ can give expression to a concept of a shade
‘is that the associated capacity can persist into the future, if only for a short
time, and that, having persisted, it can be used also in thoughts about what
is by then the past, if only the recent past’ (1994: 57). Note though that
this is an empirical claim for which McDowell adduces no evidence. For
this claim to be falsified it would be enough to show that two shades of
colour that are just over the threshold of perceptual discrimination when
simultaneously presented would not be reliably discriminated if presented
in succession. There is indeed plenty of empirical evidence that our capac-
ity for perceptual discrimination far surpasses our capacity for perceptual
identification and that colour is no exception (Burns and Ward 1977;
Halsey and Chapanis 1951; Hardin 1988; Hurvich 1981). Raffman (1995)
drives the point home most clearly. Obviously enough, one can recognize
only what one can remember. Empirical evidence from psychophysics and
perceptual psychology makes it clear that perceptual memory is limited and
its grain much coarser than our perceptual discrimination thresholds. It
follows that, if concept possession requires a certain recognitional capac-
ity, the maximal fineness of grain of our perceptual concepts will corre-
spond to the maximal fineness of grain of perceptual memory encoding. It
is overwhelmingly unlikely that DCCs meet this constraint and hence are
associated with a recognitional capacity.
One possible move for the conceptualists is to claim that the recogni-
tional capacity underlying the mastery of a DCC is not based on a stored
representation of the colour of the original sample (otherwise Raffman’s
objection would be well-taken), but on the more general capacity to keep
track of the sample itself. Suppose that a man tries to keep track of a sample
of a given shade by always carrying it in his pocket. Could we say that he
has a recognitional capacity in so far as it is always possible for him to
compare this sample with coloured objects in his environment? No,
because there is no guarantee that the colour of the sample will not at least
slightly alter with time without him noticing the change. There is no 
such guarantee, because there is no nomic relation between the property 
of the sample by means of which he keeps track of it and its shade prop-
erty. Perhaps he could defer to the opinion of a colour expert to know
whether his sample has retained its original shade, but this would make his
concept a deferential concept. We see nothing wrong with the idea of 
deferential concepts in itself, but surely it would be a reductio ad absurdum
of the conceptualist’s strategy if his only way of preserving the claim 
that perceptual content is conceptual were to reconstrue paradigmatically
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observational concepts such as shade concepts as socially deferential 
concepts.
A more radical move the conceptualists could make would be to deny
that a recognitional requirement should be imposed on DCCs. Yet there is
a price to pay for this move and one may doubt whether it is worth paying.
One important reason for insisting that concept possession requires an
associated identification or recognition capacity has to do with the infer-
ential role of concepts. Concepts are plausibly thought to be what accounts
for the inferential powers of our beliefs and other propositional attitudes
(Crane 1992). In most cases, what explains the validity of an inference is
the presence of certain conceptual constituents as parts as the content of
the premiss. To borrow an example from Crane, a thinker who believes
that a is F and b is F and that a is not b will be disposed to believe that 
at least two things are F. What is essential for the inference to be valid is
that the same part of the content should occur in the first two premisses,
in other words they should both contain the concept F. But suppose now
that the relevant concepts are DCCs of the kind envisioned by Brewer and
McDowell. In the absence of any genuine recognitional capacity associated
with such concepts, how are we to ensure that the same demonstrative
concept figures in both premisses? The only case in which such insurance
can be given is when the contents a is coloured thus and b is coloured thus
are simultaneously available to the thinker in perceptual experience in such
a way that he can attend to both at once. As soon as the two premisses are
obtained separately, the warrant disappears, since, for lack of recognitional
capacity, the thinker will not be in a position to ascertain whether the
demonstrative concepts involved in the two premisses are the same or dif-
ferent. The inferential potential of such concepts is therefore extremely
restricted. These concepts have neither past nor future and their use in rea-
soning is confined to the here and now of perceptual experience. The con-
ceptualists may well be willing to bite the bullet. However, as we shall see
in the next section, this limitation also casts a shadow on their main
project, namely showing how perceptions can provide reasons for judge-
ments and beliefs.
5. Perceptual justification
The conceptualists take the claim that perceptual content is conceptual 
to be a consequence of the fact that perceptual experiences can provide
reasons for making certain judgements or holding certain beliefs. Their first
premiss makes explicit the link between reasons and inference. It states that
giving reasons involves identifying certain relevant propositions, namely
those contents that figure as the premisses and conclusions of inferences
explicitly articulating the reasoning involved. Their second premiss states
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that reasons must be reasons for the subject, that is, they must be internal
reasons that the subject should be able to register at the personal level and
to appreciate as reasons. Our final worry is that the ephemeral character
of the DCCs by means of which the conceptualist intends to capture 
the content of perceptual experiences makes the reasons provided by these
experiences equally ephemeral. Suppose, for instance, that a perceptual
experience whose content is captured demonstratively, as the conceptual-
ists suggest, as ‘that is (coloured) thus’ provides a reason for making a
certain judgement or holding a certain belief. How long does the judgement
or belief remain justified by this reason? Given the lack of recognitional
capacity associated with DCCs, the subject ceases to possess them as 
soon as his perceptual relation to the relevant samples breaks off. As a 
consequence, when the reason for a certain judgement or belief is a per-
ceptual experience with a strongly context-dependent conceptual content,
the judgement or belief retains its justification only as long as the percep-
tual experience in question is enjoyed. The problem is that here we cannot
have a transition from a perception-based to a memory-based reason for a
given judgement or belief. In certain conditions, if the initial reason a
subject has for a certain judgement is his perception that p, this reason 
can evolve into a memory reason for the judgement. The subject now
remembers that p or remembers having perceived that p. But one condition
for the transition to occur is that the subject be able to entertain the thought
that p both initially, at the moment of perception, and later, when he is
remembering. This in turn requires that the concepts that are the con-
stituents of the thought that p be possessed by the subject both at the 
time of perception and later when he is remembering. But this condition 
does not hold when the constituents of the content of the perceptual 
experience are strongly context-dependent DCCs. The weaker requirement
that the subject simply remembers having had a perceptual reason for
making a certain judgement, without necessarily now having the concep-
tual means to entertain a thought with the same content as the reason, 
does not suffice to guarantee that the judgement remains justified. The
problem is that if one remembers having had a reason for making a 
certain judgement but cannot remember what the reason was, since one 
has lost the concepts needed to articulate it, one will not always be in a
position to recognize whether the newly presented evidence defeats one’s
initial reason for making the judgement. Suppose the reason a subject 
initially had for making a judgement was a perceptual experience with the
content ‘a is thus1’ and suppose he now has perceptual evidence that 
‘a is thus2’. If he has not retained the capacity to think thoughts with the
content ‘x is thus1’, he will not be in a position to recognize whether or not
his new evidence that ‘a is thus2’ defeats his initial reason for making the
judgement.
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6. Conclusion
In this paper, we have put forward three main arguments against the claim
that perceptual content is fully captured by demonstrative contents like
This is thus. These arguments emphasize different facets of the same
problem. Whereas the second argument shows that lack of diachronic
recognition severely limits the inferential potential of demonstrative judge-
ments, the first argument entails that even synchronic recognition is 
problematic; given the bizarre conditions of individuation of DCCs, a
judgement that two coloured samples have exactly the same shade can
never be perceptually justified. Finally, the third argument stresses that,
even in cases where judgements involving DCCs are justified by perceptual
experiences, the perceptual reasons last only as long as the experiences do.
In conclusion, let us make clear that we have said nothing against the
coherence of context-dependent classifications. On the contrary, a judge-
ment expressed by ‘That is thus’ in a given context can have a fully con-
ceptual content. What we have claimed is that, although such a content is
based on the perception of things and their qualities, it cannot substitute
for the content of perceptual experience itself. The modes of presentation
expressed by demonstrative predicates like ‘is thus’ cannot both satisfy the
essential constraints on the individuation of concepts and capture the phe-
nomenology of perceptual experience. So, if experience has a content, it
cannot be fully captured by concepts, even if we allow for conceptual,
context-dependent classifications of things.1
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